Ambiguity & Diplomacy

References to “strategic ambiguity” are ubiquitous in policy debates over the U.S.’s posture over Taiwan. Yet the term has been primarily conceptualized as a solution to a narrow problem-space: deterrence. In this paper, we suggest that strategic ambiguity might be a solution to another important problem-space: to help state leaders prevent a “face-off” from escalating further. This involves state leaders sending out feelers to get a sense if the other party desires to not escalate while doing so with sufficient ambiguity to plausibly deny that either of you actually desire to de-escalate, and thus saving face at home. Crucially, this must go both ways: plausibly denying knowledge of your opponent’s desire to de-escalate makes it easier for them to save face to their own constituents, which makes it easier to de-escalate, and help you save face. In making this argument, the paper offers an alternative way of interpreting “talk” in international politics—not only whether it is cheap talk or a credible signal of resolve, but also as a means of managing competing pressures from domestic and international audiences. We illustrate this logic in three cases: the Cuban Missile Crisis; NATO expansion; and the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis.