Ambiguity & Diplomacy

References to “strategic ambiguity” are ubiquitous in policy debates over the U.S.’s posture over Taiwan. Yet the term remains undertheorized in both international relations scholarship and the broader policy world. In this paper, we suggest the raisond'être of strategic ambiguity is not deterrence, but to help state leaders prevent a “face-off”
from escalating further. Strategic ambiguity enables state leaders to both send coded signals of one’s desire to not escalate, while simultaneously performing toughness so as to avoid losing face at home or to allies. Crucially, face-saving must go both ways: plausibly denying knowledge of your opponent’s desire to avoid escalation makes it easier for them to back down without losing face, which in turn makes it easier for them to not challenge your own performances of toughness. While strategic clarity utilizes credible signals of resolve with the hope of prevailing in
bargaining crises, it inadvertently goads the other party to issue credible signals of their own. By contrast, strategic ambiguity allows two state leaders to escape a “face-off” altogether – both avoiding escalating abroad without losing face at home. We illustrate this logic in three cases: the Cuban Missile Crisis; NATO expansion; and the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis.